CARACAS, Saturday April 30, 2005 | Update
Pro-government leader Eliécer Otaiza says the army is not prepared to resist an attack from a superpower and provides a choice for an asymmetric war (Photo: Archive)
FRANCISCO OLIVARES
EL UNIVERSAL
Pro-government leader Eliécer Otaiza's statement of
"people should get ready to hate gringos," veiled another,
more significant and worrisome remark about what should be
actually considered in the event of a war.
Otaiza explained that "in the event of a war (with the United
States) the Venezuelan army would be totally dismantled (...)
People should be trained to be aware of the enemy and realize
that confronting it may take at least from seven to nine years."
Therefore, Otaiza bears in mind that the army is not prepared
to resist an attack from a superpower and provides a choice
for an asymmetric war. Once the Venezuelan army is defeated,
organized reserves and defense grassroots forces would resist
the attack.
Is the army ready to face a foreign military attack?
Instead of giving a yes/no polar answer, following is the
first of two issues intended to weigh the situation of the
Venezuelan army in the context of South American defense.
Making war
Renowned theoretician Sun Tzu, whose works are the pillow
book of Army Commander Raúl Baduel, stated two centuries
ago that "nobody can make war if he lacks the means to make
it." He advised that an army could take action provided that
there is money, operational capacity and mobilization. "When
a country is impoverished as a result of military operations,
this is due to distant transportation, carrying supplies..."
How much will it cost? "Government expenses to replace broken
cars, bolter horses, armor and provisions take up to 60 percent
of a nation wealth." Is Venezuela or any other Latin American
country able to make war?
Crumbled belief
The military secrecy enjoyed by Latin American armed forces
for many years originated the myth of efficient organizations
ready both to ensure defense and lead the nation destiny because
they were composed of highly skilled individuals. Due to military
secrecy, not much was known about their background.
Surveys conducted usually found a high level of credibility
and acceptance of the army.
However, from 1982, when the Falkland Islands war was waged
by Argentina and the United Kingdom, all the myths shattered
into pieces. That year, the military were supposed to ensure
Argentinean security and defense. But reality showed that
they were not prepared to confront the enemy. All defensive
and offensive mechanisms failed.
Lieutenant General Martín Antonio Balza, the Argentinean
commander responsible for the operations, wrote: "Being a
war prisoner makes room to reflect on what we have learned.
The images of senior officers teaching security and defense
plummeted that 13th day of June... So many years wasted speaking
of sovereignty, freedom, strategy... And we were not sovereign
or free or strategists."
The troops' testimonies mirrored the frustration of Argentinean
military officers who lacked training. While the Argentinean
could not win the war against the British, they could indeed
confront a British aircraft carrier with 30 assault aircrafts
and a full assault team. It was a nation in the sea.
While the Falkland Islands war disappointed the Argentinean
people, at least it helped dispel the big Latin American lies.
"You (the military) were ruling us and did not even serve
for what you were supposed to serve." It was the reaction
of disappointed people who preferred to be soccer fans rather
than advocating sovereignty and nationalism.
The big shift
There was a great commotion in the Latin American armies
due to the failed Argentinean experience in 1982. Revision
and redefinition of the concepts of security and defense began.
Venezuela was never involved. Dramatic changes occurred in
remaining Latin American countries, particularly in the Argentina-Brazil-Chile
axis.
Civilians and military learned from the events in Argentina
and made efforts at proposing sustainable development and
separating the military from politics.
Then, the concept of comprehensive defense emerged as a policy
to develop strategic military components; make progress and
enter into long-term strategic partnerships for the purposes
of sustainable technological development.
The Sun Tzu's concept -no war can be waged if there are no
means available- was patently obvious in the Falkland Islands.
folivares@eluniversal.com
Translated by Conchita
Delgado
04:17 PM. Western Hemisphere. "Damned empire; I curse you one thousand times; some day you will be finished off and wrecked. I curse you one thousand times, empire." This is the least that President Hugo Chávez has uttered to refer to the US government. In urging the Bolivarian Armed Forces to prepare for war, he said that a US raid on Venezuela through Colombia would trigger and spread over the region "the 100-year war."