ROBERTO GIUSTI
EL UNIVERSAL
 
An exceptional case in Venezuela, Aníbal Romero's viewpoints contrast with those of most intellectuals; he does not view the political scene from the left. Political science professor at Simón Bolivar University and, until Hugo Chávez's rise to power, also at military institutions, Romero concludes his analysis of the Venezuelan President's political perspectives with a dilemma: jail or life-long term in office.

Question: What are the implications of (US President George W.) Bush's comments on Chávez's relations with the rebel Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC)?
 
Answer: First, they represent a warning to the Venezuelan government regarding its bonds with the Colombian guerilla, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and subversive groups in other Latin American countries. This situation may actually lead to the Venezuelan government being deemed by the US as a sponsor of terrorism. Second, this is a message from Bush to Latin American leaders: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Cristina de Kirchner, Tabaré Vásquez, Alan García and those in the Caribbean countries: "Álvaro Uribe represents democracy and the fight against terrorism whereas Chávez is taking a different path."
 
Q: Why now and not earlier?
 
A: The US would have preferred to let Chávez sink deeper by just carefully waiting and seeing. But after Chávez erased all ambiguity concerning his relations with the Colombian guerilla and in light of new evidence (the personal computers of late FARC's number two man Raúl Reyes and other guerilla members), the wheels of the implacable US justice system have been set in motion.
 
Q: What precisely do you mean by that last phrase?
 
A: Bush may be responding to information from the Department of Justice on the need for a legal investigation on the situation of Chávez and the Colombian guerilla. If it is confirmed that Chávez sponsors the guerilla, the US is legally compelled to take action. Abstaining from doing so may result in a violation of American law, which establishes that a state supporting terrorism poses a threat to the United States, and it is the duty of the American government to respond.
 
Q: How would it respond?
 
A: There are several stages. The most severe action would be to label Venezuela as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. At present, five countries have been designated as sponsors of terrorism: North Korea, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, and Iran.

Q: What are the implications of being considered a sponsor of terrorism?
 
A: If Venezuela were designated as such, which has not happened, three laws would apply, namely the Export Administration Act, the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. In this connection, four types of sanctions could be imposed: limitations on US foreign aid, a ban on arms sales, controls over exports of dual-use items (which may be used for both war and peace) and financial restrictions. These are initially the most severe measures. However, designation as a state sponsoring terrorism implies an immediate impairment on the capacity of US companies to do business in or trade with Venezuela. This would affect oil sales to the US. These are serious circumstances.
 
Q: What would be the status of Venezuelan property and holdings in the US?
 
A: They could be frozen as Libya's and Iran's once were because these restrictions act as an ever-tightening tourniquet.
 
Q: Is the status of a state sponsor of terrorism also applied by the European Union?
 
A: The European Union has designated FARC as a terrorist organization. Europeans, in the end, let the US act things out while they wait and see. Nevertheless, they are also affected by this situation because they must protect themselves so that US companies can continue to do business with them.
 
Q: Would the same apply to Latin America?
 
A: Latin American countries must take matters into their own hands. After the rocambolesque episodes stemming from Raúl Reyes's death and Chávez's unfortunate decision making, the latter realized that he was venturing into dangerous territory and took a few steps back.
 
Q: What facts evidence his backtracking?
 
A: There are four underlying causes: he was not supported by Venezuelan masses in his aggressive attitude toward Colombia; the Armed Forces opposed to the possibility of a war in which Venezuela might have not had the upper hand; Chávez was frightened by Uribe's threat of taking matters before the International Criminal Court in The Hague and, finally, I believe he was warned against the consequences of being designated a state sponsor of terrorism. This tactical retreat was apparent in the Río Group summit (where he found a way to cop out, leaving Correa to fend for himself), in recent changes to his stance on regional issues and finally in the summit with Uribe that is currently being planned.
 
Q: Is a bilateral summit enough to erase mutual accusations and offenses?
 
A: This summit, if held, conveys a deep meaning. Whatever remains of the guerilla, from a military standpoint, will have to understand that it cannot rely on Chávez as its salvation.  
 
Q: Will Chávez leave the guerilla stranded so that he can avoid sanctions?
 
A: Cuba is possibly trying to bring Chávez to reason. Not because he really intends to but because there is no other path left to tread, Chávez may actually be heading for the direction of admitting that the Colombian guerilla, as an armed movement, is politically done for and its military capabilities may be easily destroyed soon. Chávez might be compelled to admit this defeat, which is his own as much as it is his allies'.
 
Q: Do you mean that Chávez's continental project has been defeated?
 
A. On December 2, (when he lost a referendum on his proposed changes to the Constitution) Chávez experienced a strategic defeat domestically, one from which he may not recover. As his constitutional presidential term comes to an end, it is evident that he may not establish a political project that was already rejected. Only a miracle could allow him to extend his presidency beyond the constitutional term. Internationally, the death of Reyes and the Río Summit put an end to his expansion project in Latin America. Uribe came out victorious.
 
Q: If Chávez has suffered internationally, why declare his government a sponsor of terrorism?
 
A: In the US, there is a true separation of powers. The US Supreme Court does not sit around watching "Aló, Presidente", Chávez's weekly-televised broadcast, to render its decisions. If the Department of Justice holds evidence of support to the guerrilla and terrorist groups of the Middle East, as denounced by Shimon Peres, the wheels of the justice system of the United States will be set in motion, regardless of what Bush may think, say or feel.  
 
Q: If so, what would the process be like?
 
A: The Department of the State would make a statement to the different government organizations: departments of Treasury, Justice (police, FBI), etc...
 
Q: An arrest warrant?
 
A: This is not about a single person; it is about a state. Venezuela and the Chávez government will suffer the consequences.
 
Q: Is there any personal liability because it was Chávez who made that decision?
 
A: If Hugo Chávez does not fundamentally change his stance in the rest of his constitutional term in office, he may be tempted to further prolong his stay at all cost  since his only other choice would be imprisonment in Venezuela or abroad. He has gone much too far, giving rise to very serious criminal implications. They will persist throughout time since certain crimes may be subject to prosecution regardless of when they were committed. Chávez has five more years in office. He still has a chance to make amends and stop his downfall toward the thin line between politics and criminality.  Will he do so? It is not his nature.

Translated by Félix Rojas