Politics
"Mobsters, mafia, thugs, imbeciles, shameless, crooks, traitors, paramilitary, imperial pawns, bandits, thugs, cowards, drug dealers or terrorists" are just some of the epithets that President Chávez has used to label opposing candidates throughout his campaign around the country. These insults are followed by threats that if the opposition wins the upcoming elections on November 23rd, he will launch a "military plan" or "Plan Chávez" to be deployed in the states and municipalities in which his party may be defeated. "No one should forget that this is a peaceful revolution, yet it is one that bears arms." Chávez's political campaign is marked by violent and threatening rhetoric that some see as presidential delirium caused by fear of losing important regional governments and others view as a thoroughly mapped-out strategy aimed at biasing voters.

Regardless of the nature of those remarks, Chávez has turned local elections into a referendum on a new reelection.

"Chávez is placing intense efforts on our real need to win all governor offices," said Minister of Information Andrés Izarra, referring to what he labels "highly important" work performed by the president in support of his party's candidates. He acknowledges that, without Chávez's "backing," the panorama "would not seem bright."

From the time the candidates were chosen, Chávez has taken the local election process as a life and death matter and demanded fidelity to his leadership: "I beg you not to betray our people" (he is the people) and warned that only two options exist: "A socialist nation or death."

From then on the local election has become a battle to secure his hold on power: "they want to kill me" or "they will go after me," shifting from victim to aggressor according to the occasion.

All of the government party's political signs and ads feature Chávez beside the regional candidate, showcasing his own preeminence over his party's candidates. "If I do not win here, I will be forced to revise my relations with Zulia," he declared from that eastern state while the actual candidate acquiesced in silence and resignation to the omnipotent vote-seeking speech. In similar fashion, the president has set out to campaign by biasing voters and masking the everyday issues people are facing.

Violent Rhetoric
Teodoro Petkoff points out that "something must definitely be going on within the Chávez camp." In the editorial of newspaper TalCual dated October 27th, Petkoff  wrote that he initially believed that the electoral strategy of the president was to create tension in the political scenario and intensify voters' polarization, using "brutal language filled with insults and lies." Nevertheless, "at this stage," he adds, "it is impossible to believe that his behavior is grounded on political strategy or rationality."

Based on surveys, the director of pollster Datanálisis, Luis Vicente León, believes that Chávez's insults are not temperamental tantrums because he sees himself at a loss. Even if these actions are concentrated in regions in which he is not leading, these violent attacks toward his adversaries are far from spontaneous. These radical stances and uses of violent language are deliberately seeking to bias voters.

When asked whether they agree with the use of violent language against other candidates, over 68% of the people surveyed said they disagree with aggressive speeches. Instead, people express the need for conciliation and agreement between government and opposition, business sectors and institutions. Rejection of violent language does not imply rejection toward Chávez, however.

Entirely rational and devoid of temperament, that seems to be the logic applied by Chávez: radicalism is rejected but Chávez is not. In his speeches, the president raises the tone, but expresses that he is defending against coup plotters, imperialism, paramilitary factions and mafias set out to murder him, which want him out and end with the socialist project intended for the people.

The people speak
In the opinion of Oscar Shemel, president of Hinterlaces, Venezuelans in general, including the average Chávez followers, question the polarization of the country and, in contrast, want unity and solidarity. The insults and strong language used by the president toward his adversaries is deeply rejected, as evidenced by focus group surveys conducted by this company.

A young woman aligned with Sector D Chávez's supporters said during one of the Hinterlaces focus groups: "The thing I like most (about Chávez) is his work for the community; what I do not like is his radicalism; he is so radical." An opposing woman declared that what she did not like was that "he split the country and brought about greater violence. In the past, sure there were rich people, followers of the Copey party, but people were not killing one another; these things are happening in our country." A NI-NI, term used for those undecided or not in favor of neither government nor opposition, said, "I do not like the way he speaks; sometimes he overdoes it. He uses insults. He goes way too far. That is the bad thing about him; he really crosses the line."

According to Shemel, qualitative monitoring by Hinterlaces shows that the presidential influence is no longer mechanically reproduced in the decisions of Chávez's followers. Nevertheless, this rift does not imply that the opposition is the logical choice for voters who no longer trust the president's political efforts. The main issue is that original Chávez followers have not entirely divorced the president; the simply doubt his capacity to pursue the best political initiatives.

Several factors at play
Chávez's radicalism is just one of the pieces in the puzzle. Other variables exist. When he himself is playing the role of candidate, he has repeatedly toned down on the insults. In this case, the situation is much more complex because Chávez must necessarily endorse and support candidates that may not be as strong, adds León.

Two factors arise: the leader's popularity and the trust upon that leader. With nothing more that his current popularity, if Chávez were a candidate now, he could win the elections. There is a loss of trust in his government, however. Therefore, it is not easy for Chávez to directly transfer his momentum to a third party, and that is the reason why he seeks to turn the process into a plebiscite. Radicalism gives rise to polarization, and this shifts the focus on the everyday issues that have led to the loss of trust in his administration, according to the analyst.

Weak Candidates
Another aspect affecting this strategy is that certain states have local issues that are more evident and require immediate attention. These issues cannot be concealed and when Chávez visits those specific regions, the issues flare and people do associate the local struggles with Chávez, which results in a loss of trust in his administration.

His appearances show that Chávez is stronger that both his candidates and opponents. Consequently, the strong faces a smaller candidate, as noted from his remarks on candidate Pablo Pérez: "Now they want to put an imbecile in the governor's office to do whatever he (current Zulia state governor Manuel Rosales) says," and "I am speaking nothing but the truth; now he wants to have an imbecile as governor, an imbecile who cannot even speak properly." Another example was in reference to the opposition candidate to the Mayor's Office of Sucre Municipality of the Federal District, Carlos Ocariz, whom Chávez referred to as: "Someone named Ocariz, who wants to be mayor of Petare, a rich boy. We are going to swat away those rich kids, born with a silver spoon in their mouths."

According to Luis Vicente León, mockery is not a strategy that works in Venezuela when pitting the strong against the weak. However, he said, all that remains, is waiting for the surveys to learn about the actual effect of this trend.

folivares@eluniversal.com

Translated by Félix Rojas

Francisco Olivares
EL UNIVERSAL